COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"I should think, that the name of Earl St. Vincent would appear in a satisfactory light, even as the "successor of Earl Spencer, or of any other man known to this country, more especially in a period "of war, which calls for *all the exertions of the Executive Government*. Whether the contest be of short "or of long duration; if we are still to struggle with continued difficulties, I will ask: is not the "name of that Noble Earl *a shield and bulwark to the nation?*"——Mr. Pitt's Speech, March 25, 1801.

NAVAL INQUIRY.

SIR,——As you have had the goodness to insert my former letter in your valuable Register, I will now resume a subject, which was there left unfinished.—It contained some reasons contradictory of Sir Charles Pole's, Sir Edward Pellew's, and Captain Markham's assertions, (reasons that I alleged, would be supported by any number of naval officers, who might be examined at the bar of the House,) "that our naval force is equivalent to every probable demand upon it."—In continuation, I beg to suggest, as an argument of naval insufficiency, the probability of our being engaged in a war with Spain, at the moment of French invasion. And again; our being now compelled to acquiesce in indignities and insults, from the petty state of Algiers.—But the advocates of Lord St. Vincent, talk of the French ports, and those Spanish ones resorted to by French ships being *hermetically sealed*, so that their squadrons and ships, though most desirous of getting to sea, can never accomplish their purpose; and, they call on our merchants to join in applause, of the man, under whose administration, British commerce passes unmolested, from one quarter of the globe to the other, unburthened by such heavy insurance, as shackled it during the last war.—The enemy's having desired to quit their ports, appears somewhat problematical, for Admiral Cornwallis has been twice unavoidably driven from his station, and forced into Torbay. They never attempted to come out on these occasions; or, when Lord Nelson quitted his station before Toulon, to try on a war of *words* with the Dey of Algiers. These opportunities having been passed over by them, conveys no proof of their wish to leave Toulon or Brest.——Let us now examine, whether in defiance of hermetical sealing on other ports, the enemy have not put to sea from, gone abroad, and returned into them, without being intercepted.——Admiral Hartsink's squadron found means to escape.——The du Guay Trouan and a frigate returned from St. Domingo.—A ship of the line from the West Indies arrived at Brest.——Some French line of battle ships moved from L'Orient to Rochfort. In short, since the commencement of the present war, I know not a single *positive* instance, of the enemy's ships of force having been prevented quitting, and returning to their ports, particularly those included in Sir E. Pellew's command! As to our trade suffering less, and the insurance being somewhat lower than in the last war, they are only the natural consequences of the enemy's privateers and seamen being detained by the First Consul's order, to assist in the invasion of this country.—But, allowing the enemy's ports are as effectually blockaded, as the nature of such service renders practicable, it would be highly criminal, at so awful a moment as this, to trust the security of our coasts to imperfect protection, whilst *better* is within our reach.——As our naval force is at present distributed, every thing *depends on the efficiency of Admiral Cornwallis's fleet*, which is constantly exposed to all the *accidents* incident to naval operations at sea; whilst the enemy remain securely, watching to take advantage of them in their harbour. ——Such a position might suffice for us in ordinary cases, but in the present, *our game is desperate, the whole stake depending on the cast of a die!!*——Should the fleet under our gallant admiral, be shattered in a storm, or driven far to the westward, by a continuance of easterly winds, (which even now may be the case) and should the enemy's fleet, consisting of thirteen sail of the line, and frigates with troops, put to sea immediately on the weather's moderating, and the winds veering to the south-south-east, or south, and keeping along their own coasts, until as high up Channel as Guernsey, press forward to ours between Dungenness and Harwich, sweeping the Channel as they passed, without suffering themselves to be detained, and notifying their approach to the flotillas at Boulogne; they would have every probability in favour of a safe arrival at their destination, and being able to maintain a superiority at it, at least for 48 hours; a time amply sufficient for enabling their whole

force, collected on the opposite shores, to pass the channel under their protection, and reach our coast uninjured. In such event, "farewell, a long farewell to all our great-"ness."——I am aware, I shall be told, the attempt I have been supposing, would be dangerous, and its success improbable: this, I, in some degree, allow; but similar considerations would not weigh much with the enterprising Buonaparté, when opposed to the immense advantages it may secure him. —Besides, I cannot admit, that his endeavouring to pass over to Ireland, (which all agree he may be likely to attempt) would be less hazardous; and England holds out an infinitely stronger temptation.—Supposing him to make the attempt in the Channel, and to be closely pursued by Admiral Cornwallis, a retreat would always be open to him in the ports of Holland and Norway, or north about.——In all military operations much must be left to fortune. A maxim the First Consul has always followed, and hitherto with great success. When opposed to such a man, we ought not to guard alone against probable attacks, but should prepare ourselves to meet such as are barely possible.——At the commencement of the last war, when our naval force was greater, and our enemy's ports were as well secured as now, it was apparently, almost impossible, that their fleets and squadrons should elude the vigilance of our ablest admirals; put to sea; anchor in our ports; capture islands and places many hundred leagues distant; threaten our foreign settlements; considerably annoy our trade; and, finally, return in safety to their own harbour.——Yet, it is known, that the French fleet with transports and troops, did get out of Brest, and after anchoring for ten days in Bantry Bay, went almost unmolested back again to Brest.—— It is equally certain, that whilst Lord Bridport was off that harbour, a French fleet of 23 or 24 sail of the line escaped; and went to Cadiz, Carthagena, and Toulon, and then returned to Brest by the same route, reinforced by the Spanish fleet from Carthagena and Cadiz, without firing a single shot, except at one or two of our ships of war, which they captured. French troops were also landed on the coast of Wales, and the ships that carried them returned safe.——It is also certain, that Richery, with 5 or 6 sail of the line, escaped from Cadiz, where he had been long blocked up; threatened the island of Newfoundland, and [illegible] our trade very seriously, and then arrived [illegible] in a French port.—— [illegible] more extraordinary [illegible] successful enterprise from Toulon; where, in presence, as it were, of a vast superiority of naval force under Lord St. Vincent, they succeeded in collecting from all the ports in the Mediterranean, an immense Armada; sending it to sea; capturing the island of Malta, and afterwards in landing their troops and stores on the coast of Egypt; (a distance of nearly 500 leagues,) without experiencing any molestation on their route. In giving this catalogue of former disasters, it has not been my intention, to censure either the marine minister of the time, or the officers employed under him; they are stated, simply as warnings, against a too great confidence being hereafter placed in the blockading system; the imperfection of which they strongly demonstrate. But, in our present situation, the relying upon such a system, as our sole means of defence from invasion, would be more objectionable than ever, as the enemy's preparations greatly exceed any made in former times; and, as the actual condition of our large ships, unfits them for supporting so wearing and destructive a service——In appreciating the risks the present crisis exposes us to, it would be the height of folly to reject the lessons of experience, or implicitly to rely for security on the measures of one, whose errors the country has already severely suffered from. Had there been a British squadron on the coast of Ireland, (when the French, during the late war, anchored in Bantry Bay,) of sufficient force to contend with it, the enemy, most likely, would never have gone there, or if they had, might have been beaten, and perhaps destroyed.—— For the effectual defence therefore of our coasts against the dangers that menace them, it appears indispensable we should have assembled on its most vulnerable parts, a fleet *equal* to that at Brest; this is particularly needful on the coast of Ireland, and between the Isle of Wight and Yarmouth. If we have not, at present, a sufficient number of ships employed for this arrangement, when coupled with the system now pursued, we ought to preserve those we have with increased care; a duty the more incumbent, as there is small chance of their value being diminished by any addition being made to our *large ships*, during the present war; (unless it be protracted like the siege of Troy,) for the alarming, and, as I fear it will prove, increasing deficiency in this description of our force; we are indebted to the Board of Naval Inquiry, and to Lord St. Vincent's *ill-timed economy!*——But to return to the arguments used by this noble lord's satellites on Thursday evening.—They deprecated Mr. Pitt's motion, as dangerous

a compliance with it, they argued, would convey information to the enemy, create distrust in Lord St. Vincent, and injure the service, whose officers would be called by it, from their other duties, to attend the House. Surely such a string of ridiculous objections, have seldom been seriously brought forward. Whoever is master of a six-penny piece may obtain Steele's Navy List in exchange for it, and whether the purchase be made by a Frenchman or not, the dreaded information will be found in its pages, without reserve or mystery. But distrust of Lord St. Vincent; is that to be so lightly treated? To this I must answer, with the bluntness of my profession, that the navy cannot think worse of him than they do; and, as to sea officers being called from their stations, Mr. Pitt could never have thought their being so an immediate consequence of his motion. Some opinion of this kind, perhaps took possession of people's minds, from Sir Edward Pellew's *unexpected* appearance in the House. It was immediately rumoured, that he had been sent for post, by the Admiralty, in defiance of their customary parsimony. When, however, it is known, what was certainly the case, that Sir Sydney Smith, just before, vainly solicited the Board's permission for passing a week in London, that he might transact some private business of great importance. Sir Edward Pellew's being sent for will scarcely be believed.——To end this digression, however, for the immediate pressure of Mr. Pitt's motion, officers on *half pay*, unless the novel opinions started with respect to them the other evening were fully established, might have been supposed unexceptionable, and competent channels of professional information to the House. The fulsome panegyricks, on Lord St Vincent's general conduct and character, that closed the speeches of several members, particularly those of Messrs. Tierney and Sheridan, I should have passed over in silence, for they were perfectly irrelevant to the motion before the House, (as was well observed in your excellent papers of the 24th) had I not now seen with you, an evident intention on the part of those gentlemen, not only to obtain an indemnity for his past faults, but security for future ones. Or rather, perhaps, to persuade the House he was impeccable; for they undoubtedly imputed an unpopularity they could not deny, *solely* to the exercise of his virtues.——Struck with the virtuence of this noble reformer, some people out of doors have doubted the purity of his motives, questioning whether the principal objects in establishing the Board of Naval Enquiry, were not the casting over general unpopularity a veil of economy and reform; they also pretend, that an increase of influence both in and out of Parliament, was too probably in view. Sir Charles Pole, however, who laboured so indefatigably in opposition to Mr. Pitt's motion, contrary to the general sense of his brother officers, is a very good sort of a man. Mr. Ford is a good sort of man, and an old schoolfellow of Mr. Addington's. Mr. Listen is a very good sort of a man, and so is Mr. Bouverie, who is a great friend of Mr. Fox's. Some naval officers, on half-pay, fancy they know more of navy matters than these gentlemen do, and find some unbigotted to the belief of Lord St. Vincent's and Mr. Addington's perfect disinterestedness, ready enough to concur in their opinion. But this is nothing; half-pay officers are known to be, generally speaking, abominably poor; and the enlightened and fashionable part of society care little for what may be said by such queer looking weather beaten old fellows. Our naval officers are certainly discontented with the present First Lord; but they are, certainly, neither *peculators or contractors*; no body of men can excel them in disinterestedness, and high sense of honour! But, for the sake of argument, call them mercenary, what advantage is to result to them from a continuance of the abuses in question? Assure yourself, Mr. Editor, that from *real* reform they must benefit. But, what further degradation is in store for naval officers? Not content with holding them up through the medium of his retainers, as men unreasonably dissatisfied, undeserving of credit, leagued with peculators, and traitors to their country, the minister has thought proper, in his own person, to insult the feelings of all the superior officers, by presenting to the attention of Parliament, as his ablest and most confidential advisers on maritime affairs, *Capt. Day and Lieut. Tokely!* Capt. Day is a commander on half-pay. Lieut. T. has, for some years past, had the command of a gun-boat!!!——One is really almost led to imagine from this, and some other strange circumstances, that the patience of our naval officers is systematically tried. It is, perhaps, as part of this discipline, near 30,000 sea fencibles commanded by naval officers not above the rank of captain, in the event of invasion, are put under the command of *generals*; whilst three-fourths of the list of admirals remain on half pay; and are, it is conjectured, destined to fight in the ranks, or take an oar in a gun boat? Is such treatment of officers calculated to support their dignity, and to enable them to resist the rapid progress a spirit of insubordination

is making in their service? Those against whom similar insults have been practised, would be degraded in their own eyes, as well as those of others, if honourable indignation against the introducers of despotism and anarchy, did not support them! In attempting fairly to estimate Lord St. Vincent's former services, I must regret having to speak of some, which I cannot approve, and of others, where he appears to have been, in my opinion, criminal. If the past alone were in question, I would stifle part of my sentiments, and join in the general plaudits; but now, placed at the head of one of the highest offices in the state, his own imprudence, or that of his friends, induces him to call on the country for future credit in consideration of past services; it ought not, therefore, to be deemed an invidious undertaking in any to investigate the real quality of these achievements, and in attempting it as a duty to those, who cannot appreciate their merit themselves, I pledge myself "to set down "naught in malice."——With his lordship's first services in the navy, I am unacquainted; but, the professional knowledge he has shewn, since the capture of the Pegase, make me suppose they were creditable.—— Beginning with this service performed when Capt. Jarvis, and for which he received the red ribbon. It must be remarked, that the Foudroyant, which he commanded, was superior in force and sailing to the Pegase; and that the latter had been very hastily built, and was just come out of port, (as was said) badly manned; the channel fleet is believed to have been in sight when she was first chased; and the action, or rather running fight, took place in the dark; for the commander of the Pegase, did not dare to shorten sail, or even to yaw his ship, from apprehension of the British fleet being near.—— After the war, which commenced in 1793, his lordship remained some time unemployed, from a *known reason*. As Commander in Chief, his first services were with his firm friend and zealous supporter, Lord Grey; (who is one of the best officers, and most worthy men the country ever produced.) Some parts of Lord St. Vincent's conduct, and their consequences, during that command, have been so minutely described by you, as to render the dwelling upon them here needless. At the moment, I did not think his lordship so culpable in the transaction you alluded to, as he appeared to many others. There was a practise strongly imputed to him, of unnecessary searching, which one of his present colleagues at the Admiralty can speak to most pointedly.——The battle of the 14th Feb. was eminently useful to the country, and much of its success has generally been attributed to his lordship: yet it is incontestibly true, that this was not done by *all* the flag officers who shared in the honours of the day.——During his lordship's subsequent command in the Mediterranean, he strove to establish some *new* doctrines and principles in the navy, that at first sight alarmed many, whose apprehensions of their nature and tendency, the event has but too seriously justified. At the same period he is also known to have had serious and *extraordinary* differences with the greater part of the superior officers under his orders, some of which were little creditable to the Commander in Chief, and ill calculated to support his claim to indemnity for past faults, and security for future. Respecting the Toulon expedition in 1708, which led to such an expense of British blood and treasure; and, probably, contributed heavily to the production of immeasurable calamities; his lordship's conduct always appeared to me extremely reprehensible; he has, perhaps, the means of accounting satisfactorily for it, but I know not that he has ever done so: my own opinion, and the only lights afforded me, compel the remarks given above, and a concurrence of sentiments with those correspondents of yours who spoke largely on the subject in the Political Registers of the 9th July, 1803, and the 3d of March, 1804.— "I. H. says, in your last number, nothing "can be more unfair than looking back "through a series of years to judge the "merits of a military transaction; the in"formation a general can obtain, the or"ders he is under, the force he commands; "in short, the circumstances of the mo"ment which pressed upon him, are the "only elements from which honour and "justice will decide upon his conduct." There cannot be a better general rule than I. H. has here given; but, I must contend, that the case which it produced, is a fair exception from it. Retrospective inquiry has a look of asperity, and should not be lightly instituted, yet it may be necessary. In the instance before us, the officer whose merits are under examination, narrowly avoided an inquiry called for by the importance of the business, and some suspicions attached to it, when recent. Had he been contented with security, we might have been with silence; but, no; he springs forward to the bar of the public, and boldly claims future confidence, as a reward of past services. It is not then an unbecoming, or harsh mea-

sure of justice, as the documents and evidences requisite for considering some of those past services are now existing, that decisions should be a little delayed, that time and opportunity for cool reflection should be given on points, from which so strong an inference is to be deduced; nor can it be fairly deemed a mark of pique or prejudice, that we refose with head-long and revolutionary impetuosity to follow Capt. Markham in determining upon them by acclamation ——No stranger to the difficulties officers have to encounter, and the prejudice which a faithful discharge of their duty too often excites against them, I should always wish the most liberal construction might be put on their actions, and all propo-als of vexatious inquiry resisted; but this is no trivial and paltry question of military array, as whether round or cocked hats should be the dress of our quarter decks; but one in which the existence and security of the country are implicated; difficulty and danger threaten us from without, and may we not examine whether our greatest bulwark is in safe and strong keeping. Not a doubt of it can be entertained without palsying some man's courage, and every arm may soon become of importance.——A man's refusal to throw strong light on any part of his conduct subject to different interpretations, is no argument of conscious integrity. ——Mr. Fox thought highly of his friend, and therefore voted for inquiry, similar reasoning should have led Lord St. Vincent to call for it.—It is true, he has refused it himself to officers who claimed it as their birthright, they have been injured and dissatisfied, but are not, I dare venture to believe, goaded into a wish that *the same measure he used should be used to him again*; and that, in defiance of all that has formerly been held sacred, then should be *condemned unheard.* Lord K lwarden's last words, speaking of a wretch who had assisted in murdering him, were, "*let him have his fair trial:*" so says, of Lord St. Vincent,

your humble servant,

AN OLD SEAMAN.

March 24, 1804.

LONDON COMMON COUNCIL.

SIR,—I am an old sea officer resident upon the sea coast of Kent, much attached to my profession, and devoted to the maintenance of its honour and its interests. Whatever has a tendency to affect either cannot be indifferent to me.——I have seen, therefore, with surprize, as well as regret, the very extraordinary resolutions of the court of common council of the city of London on the 26th instant, in which they appear, without a spark of official information, to have taken it upon themselves to stamp with their positive approbation the conduct of some of the officers commanding his Majesty's fleets and squadrons in the British and Mediterranean seas; while that of others has been marked, if not with their indirect censure, at least with their neglect and disregard. ——It is wide from my intention, Sir, to disparage the characters of the able and gallant officers whose persevering exertions have called forth the unqualified approbation of the common council, or, in the most remote degree, to detract from merit so conspicuous as theirs; but I cannot consider it consistent in any corporate body to enter into discussions or resolutions of this nature, except on the authority of the votes of Parliament, or on the communications made by his Majesty's government, through the medium of the London Gazette, one or other of which I believe it has been hitherto customary to await: for, however meritorious the conduct of officers may appear, it is impossible that the propriety of such conduct, through all its detail, can be judged of by the public, without a knowledge of the orders that have been given, and of the precision with which they have been obeyed. And I trust to make it appear from the following observations, how egregiously (though unintentionally I hope and believe) the common council have erred on this occasion; as in fact, public bodies, as well as individuals, must ever do, when they pretend to proceed to decisions on subjects not well understood, or respecting which they are either ill, or altogether uninformed.——The thanks of the common council have been voted "to Admiral Corn-"wallis, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, "Rear-Admirals Collingwood, Calder, and "Graves; and to Captains Sir Edward Pel-"lew and John Sutton, commanding the "fleets blockading the ports of Brest and "Ferrol. To Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson, "commanding the fleet blockading the port "of Toulon. To Rear-Admiral Thorn-"brough and Captain Sir Sidney Smith, "commanding the fleet blockading the "Texel and the ports of Holland. And to "the captains, officers, seamen, and ma-"rines on board the respective fleets,"—meaning, without doubt, the ships composing the fleets and squadrons under the command of Admiral Cornwallis, Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson, and Rear-Admiral Thornbrough, as these are the only commanders who have been requested to communicate the thanks to the officers, seamen, and ma-

fines, under their several commands.—— Now, Sir, what can possibly have led the common council, in these resolutions of thanks, to omit the names of Rear-Admirals Bickerton and Campbell, the junior flag officers of the Mediterranean fleet under Lord Nelson, while they have mentioned by name all those who are employed under Admiral Cornwallis at home? Or why are Captains Domett and Murray, the invaluable officers who are serving as first captains to these fleets, with the temporary rank of rear-admiral, totally forgotten, while Captains Sir Edward Pellew and Sutton commanding two of the Channel fleet ships are specially particularized? Was it because the common council were informed that all Admiral Cornwallis' juniors had given him entire satisfaction, and that Lord Nelson's second and third in command had not done so? If they had no such information, why should so invidious a distinction have been made? And on what principle is it that Captains Sir Edward Pellew and Sutton are the only two of the commanders that have been employed in blockading the enemy's ships at Ferrol, who have been thought worthy of being named? Was it under the idea of these captains being the first and second officers in the command of a detached squadron? If so, Lord Nelson's second, who is a Rear-Admiral, should certainly have been named, in preference to Sir Edward Pellew, who is only a captain; nor should the second officers of other squadrons, hereafter to be alluded to, have been passed over with indifference or neglect.——Again—nothing but a want of the necessary information which should have guided the deliberations of the common council, on such an occasion, could have led them to confine their resolutions of thanks for the blockade of the Texel and the ports of Holland to Rear-Admiral Thornbrough and Captain Sir Sidney Smith. I have had a most valuable friend employed during the winter, on an important station on the Dutch coast; and I have access to know the names and the rank of most of the officers serving there. I therefore can inform the common council, that Admiral Thornbrough's and Commodore Sir Sidney Smith's commands are perfectly distinct and unconnected with each other; and that it even lies out of the exact line of the former's duty to convey the votes of thanks to the latter, who is entrusted by the commander in chief with the direction of a separate squadron. Did the common council know this? If they did not, it is evident that they have been voting thanks on subjects which they did did not understand. If they were aware of the fact, it surely is difficult to believe it to have been their intention to mention in their resolutions of thanks, the names of the senior officers only of the squadrons that have been exposed to all the anxiety, hardship, and privation attendant upon a north sea winter's campaign; while not only the first but the second captain of a detachment of the Channel fleet have been distinguished with their particular notice. For what reason can it have been that such meritorious officers as Captain Hope, the second officer in Admiral Thornbrough's fleet, and Captain Lord Proby, Commodore Sir Sidney Smith's second, have been treated with neglect, particularly, when it is considered that these officers have actually, during long intervals, had the chief command and direction of the two squadrons in which they are employed? For I feel confident in asserting, that not only the private, but the professional characters of these officers are held in the highest respect by the rear-admiral and the commodore Why has Captain Manby, of the Africaine, who has, I believe, been entrusted with the blockade of the port of Helvoetsluys for nearly twelve months, and meritoriously supported it, experienced the common council's disregard? And what can have been the reason why the commanders of the squadron that shuts the enemy up in the harbour of Havre de Grace should have been lost sight of in these votes of thanks? I have no doubt that they are officers of high merit like the rest, although I am not, at this moment, absolutely certain of their names; but it is fresh in our recollection that that squadron was lately commanded by the Honourable Captain Gower, a gallant officer, who had the misfortune, most probably from his great anxiety to maintain his station during the winter gales, to run his ship (the Shannon) upon the rocks on the French coast during the night, and who, in that hopeless situation held out against the enemy's batteries till many of his people were killed and wounded, and till the ship had received near a hundred large cannon shot in her hull.——But above all what can have induced the common council to neglect the eminent services of the squadron employed in blockading the port of Boulogne? A more brave, zealous, and indefatigable officer does not exist than Captain Morris, of the Leopard, who has the chief command of it: and his second, Captain Owen, of the Immortalité, is an officer whose vigilance, activity, zeal, and intrepidity are almost superior to praise. This is the squadron to which is committed the anxious and arduous task of watching, under all the variety of winds, calms, fogs, and darkness the movements of the flotilla that threatens

to hoist the tricoloured flag upon London's Tower, and that will soon have to contend with a force consisting of, at least, 2000 vessels, carrying not fewer than five or six thousand guns and mortars of the largest size, and bearing an invading army of 200,000 men. This picture may appear to be exaggerated; but a little time will prove it to be just, however much it is at present the fashion to under-rate it, and hold it in contempt. Was it prudent, was it wise, was it just, Sir, on such an occasion, as that on which the common council met, to disregard the services of these officers, who have not quitted their posts during the whole winter, except when driven in, to avoid the dangers of the shoals, by the violence of the winds? And with what grace, Sir, will the common council tender votes of thanks to these meritorious officers, when the brilliancy of their services shall (as I trust they will ere long do) extort that acknowledgement of their merits, which, in the late instance, has been so invidiously with-held? —I forbear from any particular animadversion on the neglect that has been shewn by the common council, in their resolutions, to Admiral Lord Keith, who I understand has the chief command of all the fleets and squadrons employed upon the Dutch coast, and upon the French coast as far as Cherburg, and whose distinguished services are held in the highest esteem; because I think it fair to admit, that these votes of thanks were intended to be confined to the officers and men who were actually employed at sea, which has not been the case with his lordship, who from the necessary attention to so extensive a command, is obliged to reside on shore at the central position of Margate, where all his orders are issued, and where all his dispatches are received. Observations of the same kind apply to that inestimable officer, Rear-Admiral Sir James Saumerez, at Guernsey, who directs the blockading of the enemy's ports in that vicinity. I confess, however, that I was sorry to observe, that Lord Keith's name was introduced at the meeting at all, as the proposal of his friend, Sir William Curtis, appears to have been dismissed with but little mark of respect.——Under all these circumstances and facts (and I am sure, Sir, that I am generally correct, although in a few particulars respecting the commanding and second officers, I may not be perfectly so) I am persuaded that the common council will see that they have taken up a subject on which they have not, by any means, been sufficiently informed, and that they cannot have failed, not only to disgust many officers of high merit, but even to lessen the value of their own votes of thanks, by the want of discrimination with which they have been heedlessly bestowed. Let it not for a moment be imagined, Sir, that any part of the object of these strictures has been to derogate from the merits of the illustrious *flag officers and captains* whom the common council have distinguished, *by name*, with their thanks. I most cordially join in humbly offering my tribute of admiration and gratitude for the services which they have heretofore performed, and which I confidently anticipate they will yet achieve: but I am firmly persuaded, that they would not have less appreciated the resolutions of the common council, if they had been liberally extended to the flag officers and captains above-mentioned, who have been occupied, during the winter, in the performance of duties similar to those in which they have been engaged; particularly as most of the officers of the Channel fleet, as well as Lord Nelson, are fully acquainted with the anxiety, the fatigue, and the danger that must be experienced, in maintaining a position during the winter months before any of the enemy's ports in the North and Narrow Seas.

March 9, 1804. NAUTICUS.

ANGLO-GALLIC CREDITORS.

SIR,——After your excellent animadversions on the subject of the French Creditors, I was surprised to see, in your last sheet, a letter signed Mercator, on a like subject. Self is, we know, a powerful agent; but, how Mercator could think of applying to you to support his cause, after the dressing you had given those in a similar predicament, is wonderful! I well know your attachment to your country, and the manly way in which it has been shown in situations from which frenchified Mercators would have shrunk; therefore, hope you will not let him escape. One sentence particularly, I cannot help recommending to your notice: he says, he and his brethren showed their love and loyalty to England, by flying from the tyranny of Robespierre. Amazing! They shewed their love of their country, which they had abandoned for another, by flying to that country merely to save their renegado necks from the guillotine!—Is a rage for money-making the only sentiment now left among us? If not, how dare people obtrude on the public circumstances of their conduct which, with sentiments of patriotism and honour, they would wish buried in eternal night? Let money-making be the first sentiment of such hearts as Mercators; but, let him not shamelessly thrust upon our notice the unpatriotic manner in which he has acted upon that sentiment.

——— Rem, facias rem,
Si possis, recte; si non, quocunque modo rem.

Nor is he satisfied with this exhibition; he claims the compassion of his countrymen, whose society he had relinquished for that of Frenchmen their bitterest enemies; and seems to think himself intitled to a reimbursement for the losses he deservedly sustained, by preferring such society to that of his relations and fellow-citizens. In truth and justice, the reimbursement he deserves from his country is "money to buy a hal-"ter." The state of society must be very bad, when a man, not ashamed of such sentiments, and consequently striving to conceal them, takes every opportunity of poking them in our face. I leave Mr Mercator to your handling. Your sentiments I read with much pleasure, because they are those not only of a man of sense, but of an honest man. I mean not to flatter; nor will you, Mr Cobbett, suppose I do, merely because I speak what I think; but, it is seldom, in these days, that we meet with genuine effusions of manly and patriotic feeling, unadulterated by Machiavelism; unempoisoned by the absurd and baneful doctrines of equality; and unsophisticated by the affected and frivolous politeness of modern refinement. Your mode of carrying on the war (except the congress part) I always approved. I am sorry you have not continued your lucubrations on that subject; but hope to see something more of it when you shall have leisure, notwithstanding the incorrigible obstinacy of the present administration. *Magna est veritas, et prevalebit.* It ought to be felt by every British heart, that it is the mode most worthy of this brave and generous nation. Had it been followed, we might now have had in France a gallant British army of 50,000 men, supporting the unfortunate Pichegru, at the head of an army of 200,000 determined French royalists. The consequences may easily be guessed.—Adieu!

March 29, 1804. A. B.

DUKE D'ENGHIEN.

Extracted from the French Papers.

STRASBURGH, March 16, 1804.—On the evening of the 14th instant, Gen. de Caulincourt, Aide-de-Camp of the First Consul, lately arrived here, caused the gate leading into Germany to be opened, and passed through it with Gen. Levat, of the fifth military division, towards the right Bank of the Rhine. A little before this a body of infantry, and a strong division of the regiment of cavalry lying in garrison at this city, besides a division of the national guard, had been stationed on the Banks of the Rhine. They crossed this river in the night, and directed their march through Kehl to Offenbourg, which was immediately perceived by our troops. Their commandant ordered to be pointed out to him the habitations of the emigrants who resided there, whom they wished to seize. They were immediately put under arrest. Some of this description were arrested also at Kehl. This expedition was conducted in the greatest order, and executed with the greatest propriety.——It is reported that Gen. de Caulincourt and Levat have themselves returned to Offenbourg. During the whole of the morning of yesterday the passage of the Rhine was shut. Nobody was permitted to cross the river, even with passports. About mid-day the column of Offenbourg again entered our city by the citadel, after having committed to the commandant their prisoners, the number of whom amounted to about fifteen. They are provisionally detained. Among them are the Baron de Reich, and the Abbé d'Eymar.—— On the same night another column of our troops, composed of infantry, of cavalry, of artillery and gend'armes, crossed also the Rhine at Rhenau, about six leagues distance from this upon the road to Brisack.—We are assured, that their object was to reconnoitre the city of Ettenheim, and to arrest such conspirators as might be found there. Besides, by the consent of the Court of Baden, a Counsellor of Baden arrived here the day before yesterday; and during the two last days, several couriers had been dispatched to Carlsruhe, and had returned. Kehl is already evacuated by our troops, and the communication has been again established since yesterday. ——Yesterday morning were arrested here about ten persons, who are said to be implicated in the conspiracy. Among them are the ci-devant Count of Toulouse Lautree, Madame de Klengling, sister-in-law of the Gen. of that name, the Curé of Ernbheim, and others, mostly emigrants who had returned. There was also arrested here about mid-day, General Desnoyes, who had presided three years ago in the Council of War, which acquitted the accomplices of Pichegru.——Madame Lajolais, the brother of the Ex-Gen. Lajolais, Demongés and his wife, have been conducted to Paris under the escort of the gendarmerie.——The most conspicuous person arrested on this occasion is the Duke d'Enghuien, son of the Duke of Bourbon, and grand son of the Prince of Condé.

PARIS, MARCH 24.—*The following is the Official Report of the Trial of the Duke d'Enghuien, at Vincennes.*

Special Military Commission, constituted

in the First Military Division, in virtue of a Decree of the Government, dated the 29th Ventôse (20th of March) in the year twelve of the Republic, one and indivisible.

JUDGMENT.—In the name of the French Republic, this 30th Ventôse (March 21) in the twelfth year of the Republic.——The Military and Special Commission formed in the first military division, in virtue of a decree of the Government, dated the 29th Ventôse (March 20), composed, agreeably to the law of the 19th Fructidor, (Sept. 6), in the year five, of seven members, consisting of Citizens Hulen, Gen. of Brigade, Guiton, Col. Com., Bazancourt, Col. Com., Ravier, Col. Com., Barrois, Col. Com., Rabbe, Col. Com., D'Autancourt, Capt. Major, Molin, Capt.——The whole of these were named by Murat, the Gen. in Chief, Gov. of Paris, and Com. of the First Mil. Division.——The said President, Members reporting, Capt., and Register, neither being relations nor persons connected within the degrees of affinity prohibited by the law, met according to appointment.——By the orders of the Gen. in Chief, Gov. of Paris, the Commission was opened at the Castle of Vincennes, in the house of the commander of the place, for the purpose of proceeding in the trial of Louis Antoine Henry de Bourbon, Duke d'Enghuien, born at Chantilly the 2d day of August, 1772; of light hair and eye-brows, black eyes, small mouth, aqueline nose, and of a handsome figure.—— The accusations against him included six charges; which six charges were as follows: —He was accused, FIRST: of having carried arms against the French Republic. SECOND: of having offered his services to the English Gov., the enemy of the French people. THIRD: of receiving and having, with accredited agents of that Gov., procured means of obtaining intelligence in France, and conspiring against the internal and external security of the state. FOURTH: that he was at the head of a body of French and other emigrants, paid by England, formed on the frontiers of France, in the districts of Fribourg and Baden. FIFTH: of having attempted to foment intrigues at Strasburgh, with a view of producing a rising in the adjacent departments, for the purpose of operating a diversion favourable to England. SIXTH: that he was one of those concerned in the conspiracy planned by the English for the assassination of the First Consul, and intending, in case of the success of that plot, to return to France.——The Commission being opened, the President ordered the officer appointed to conduct the accusation, to read all the papers which went either to the crimination or the acquittal of the prisoner.——After the reading of these papers was finished, the accused was introduced by the guard, free and unfettered, before the Commission.——He was interrogated as to his name, surname, age, place of birth, and abode.——In his answer, he stated, that his name was Louis Antoine Henry de Bourbon, Duke d'Enghuien, aged 32 years, that he was born at Chantilly, near Paris, and that he had left France in the year 1789.——After the President had finished his interrogatories respecting all the points contained in the accusation, and after the accused had urged all that he could allege in his defence, the Members were next asked if they had any observations to offer on the subject? They all replied in the negative, and the accused was ordered to be taken out of Court, and conducted back to the prison. The officer conducting the prosecution, and the register, as well as the auditors, were then ordered to withdraw by the President.——The Court deliberated for some time, with closed doors, on the respective charges as already stated. The question was put by the President on each of the charges separately. Each of the members in succession delivered his opinion. The President was the last in delivering his judgment. The result was, that the Court unanimously found the prisoner guilty of all the six charges. The next question put was to the punishment to be inflicted. The question was here again put in the same way as before, and the following was the sentence of condemnation: —The Special Military Commission condemns unanimously to death Louis Antoine Henry de Bourbon, Duke d'Enghuien, on the ground of his being guilty of acting as a spy, of correspondence with the enemies of the Republic, and of conspiracy against the external and internal security of the Republic.——This sentence is pronounced in conformity to the second article, title 4, of the military code of offences and punishments passed on the 11th of January, in the year 5, and the second section of the first title of the ordinary penal code, established on the 6th of October, 1791, described in the following terms:—Art. II. (11th Jan. year 5). Every individual whatever be his state, quality, or profession, convicted of acting as a spy for the enemy, shall be sentenced to the punishment of death.—— Art. I. Every one engaged in a plot or conspiracy against the Republic, shall, on conviction, be punished with death.——Art. II. (6th October, 1791). Every one connected with a plot or conspiracy tending to disturb the tranquillity of the state, by civil war, by arming one class of citizens against the other, or against the exercise of legitimate

authority, shall be punished with death.—— Orders were given to the officer who conducted the accusation, to read the above sentence to the prisoner, in presence of the guard drawn up under arms.——It was at the same time ordered, that a copy of the sentence should, as soon as was consistent with the forms of law, be transmitted, signed by the President and the Accuser, to the Minister at War, to the Grand Judge, Minister of Justice, and the Gen. in Chief, Gov. of Paris.——Signed and sealed the same day, month, and year, aforesaid,

Guiton, Bazancourt, Ravier, Barrois, Rabbe, d'Autancourt, Captain Reporter; Molin, Captain Register; and Hulen, President.—*Moniteur.*

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPER.

Copy of a Letter from the French Chargé d'Affaires and Commissary General of Commercial Relations at Algiers to Citizen Ducos, Minister of Marine. Dated Algiers, January 25, 1804.

CITIZEN MINISTER,—The English appeared before Algiers on the 15th, with nine sail of the line, two of them three deckers, and one frigate and a brig. Admiral Nelson, who commanded the fleet, demanded, imperatively, in the name of his King, that the English Chargé d'Affaires, sent away from Algiers some months ago, should be honourably reinstated in his functions; he required besides, the restitution of five Neapolitan and Maltese ships taken with his passports, the release of seventy-nine unfortunate persons who composed the crews of those ships, and the severest orders to the Corsairs to respect all ships, of whatever nation they might be, which had British passports. The Dey refused every thing, and replied with much firmness to the English. After several days spent in very violent explanations, Admiral Nelson ignominiously retired. The Regency continued their preparations of defence with the greatest activity, and it may be depended upon that the Algerines will suffer a bombardment, rather than yield to one of the demands made by England.——All the agents of the different nations have retired to their country houses.——I salute you with respect, DUBOIS THAINVILLE.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

DUKE D'ENGHUIEN.—The arrest and subsequent trial of this gallant and amiable Prince, of which a full account is given in a preceding page of the present sheet, has very naturally excited universal regret. There are, however, some persons, some of the elect amongst the "safe politicians" who affect to hope, that some good may come out of it; that the outrage committed in this instance against the laws of neutrality, will, at last, rouse the powers of the Continent from that state of lethargy and debasement, into which they have fallen. In other words, these "great "hopers," as Mr. Windham called them, upon a former occasion, are by no means inconsolable, at the prospect of the Duke d'Enghuien's death, provided that it produces such a disposition in the powers of Europe as shall lead to a war with France, on the part of those powers, and as shall, thereby, create a diversion in favour of England. In short, no small portion of the "hopers" would rejoice at the Duke's death, if it would but give security to themselves for only another month or two.—— It is, too, with no very good grace, that the makers of the peace of Amiens and their partisans reproach the powers of the Continent with lethargy and baseness; nor are they aware, perhaps, that the powers of the Continent do most freely and amply retort the charge. It is very easy for us to cry out against the baseness of the Prince of Baden; but, it will not be so easy for us to defend ourselves against a similar accusation. The poor Prince of Baden has not the power to resist. Every one knows, that, if France chooses to take away his dominions, she can do it, unless he be protected by greater states; and, as to the apathy of those greater states, what right, what shadow of reason, is there for us to complain, when we have made a peace upon the acknowledged principle of "keep- "ing ourselves to ourselves;" or, according to the sentiment of Mr. Wilberforce, that "we are *too honest* to have any con- "nexions with the powers of the Conti- "nent!" While we, who have declared war against France; we, who have a population of fifteen millions; we, who have our boasted "wooden walls" and our "salt-water girdle;" while we are surrounding London with entrenchments; while we make our renown to consist in preserving ourselves from slavery; while we aim at nothing further than the "*glory*" of keeping our necks out of the Gallic yoke; while we think and act thus, how insolent is it in us to affect to lament the fallen state of the Prince of Baden! and how justly might that prince remind us, that we should do well to keep our lamentations for the Electorate of Hanover? No: while the princes of the Continent behold the example of Hanover; while they see us with soldiers whose service is confined to these islands, and with paper-money of which a

dollar will buy five shilling's worth, the "hopers" may hope, but the Continent will leave us to fight out the battle single handed.

RUSSIA.——It is, however, reported, and, by some persons, believed, that the court of St. Petersburgh is become hostile to France. Those who entertain this opinion, point out the immense force now on foot on the Germanic confines of the Russian empire; they rely much upon the change in the ministry; they refer also to the vast augmentation, which is about to take place in the French army, and to the recent depression in the French funds, which remained totally unaffected by the war with England, but which have, within the last fifteen days, experienced a depression of five per centum. There is some weight in these reasons; but another continental war, stirred up by this country, and under the present ministers, is a thing so improbable, that nothing short of an actual commencement of hostilities ought to induce us to give ear to it.

WAR IN INDIA.——In the meantime, though we can effect nothing in Europe; though even conspiracies in our favour fail there; though we are penned up in our island; though we are lining our coast, barring up the mouths of our rivers, and surrounding our capital with fortified camps; though we are tremblingly straining our eye-sight to watch the movements of our enemy, though signals and beacons are prepared to give us warning of his approach, and to indicate the moment when the people are to begin to flee with their cattle, and to leave their ricks, granaries, and barns, burning behind them; though thus situated, thus humbled and debased, in Britain, we are, it seems, carrying on a most successful and glorious war in India; where the timid, tawney-skinned natives appear to serve as an object whereon to repay the insults we so patiently endure from the French, and where our conduct seems to furnish the grounds of but too plausible a justification of the encroachments and tyranny of France. The man whose first wish is, to see preserved the throne of this kingdom and the liberties of the people; such a man, if he takes time to reflect, will not be very eager to rejoice at the result of any war in India, which shall produce an extension of territory; for, suppose that such extension does not ultimately tend to the total destruction of the British power, its effect is very little less injurious in another way. The East-India Company is already too powerful: the lawful monarchy of England cannot long support itself against the increasing influence of this association of sovereigns: the House of Brunswick is fast becoming nothing in comparison with the House of Baring & Co., of Goldsmid & Co., and fifty other Houses of the same description, which are hourly rising upon the ruins of the Aristocracy, the Church, and every thing that was once esteemed noble and venerable in the land. A reflecting man, therefore, will see, in the success of these India wars, the source of new plunder, and a consequent increase of those upstarts, who, aided by the operation of the funding system, thrust the gentry of the country from their paternal domains, and introduce into the villages of England the haughtiness and insolence exercised over the sooty slaves of Hindostan.

LONDON COMMON COUNCIL.——The proceedings of this body, with respect to the admirals and others of the navy, have been ably commented on by a correspondent, in a preceding page, to which the reader will please to refer. But, this correspondent seems to have viewed the subject in somewhat a wrong light. He does, indeed, very justly and properly observe, that no corporate body ought to enter into discussions as to the merits of officers or others of the army or navy, and especially for the purpose of passing resolutions touching those merits, except in cases where the Parliament has taken the lead; or, at least, where communications proclaiming such merits have been made through the London Gazette. These observations are very proper, but the *complaint* made in behalf of the officers, upon whom the Common Council have bestowed no commendation, appears to be of a tendency injurious to the character of those officers; and, indeed, to that of the naval officers in general, amongst whom, it would, from this complaint, seem that there existed a rivalship for the applause of the pastry-cooks and stock-jobbers and hair-dressers of the city of London. If the speechifying and the resolutions, with which these persons choose to amuse themselves and the public, are at all worthy of attention, it is as an object of censure, on account of their presumption; for, if the nobility, gentry, clergy, and yeomanry of any country had assembled, and had, without any example set by the Parliament, passed resolutions, similar to those which have been passed and published by the London Common-council, would not such county-meeting have been censured as extremely presumptuous? And, upon what ground does the corporation of London and its shop-keepers claim greater privileges than the people of a county?

What other ground than that of their own assurance co-operating with the mean mercenary spirit of the government? These were the causes out of which the "Patriotic Fund," at Lloyd's Coffee-house arose; that fund, which was artfully intended to be a reservoir of all the guineas which the nobility, gentry, and clergy could spare from their absolute necessities; that fund, which, if its growth had not been put a stop to, would have rendered its guardians the great and only source of pecuniary rewards to both army and navy; that fund, to the distributors of which we have seen a naval officer making an official report of the behaviour and deserts of his men; that fund, that insidious fund, which, in an hour of trial between the monarchy and the money, might have sapped the power of the former; that fund, of which, thank God, we hear no more.——To return, for a moment, to the resolutions of the Common-council, it is but just to allow, that the spirit, or, rather the want of spirit, by which they were dictated, is but too prevalent, amongst all classes of the community. To thank men *for not having been beaten* was reserved for the days of the Addingtons and Hawkesburies. The feeling which gives rise to thanks of this sort, is that of fear, fear of the lowest kind: as if we were to say to the fleet: "thank you! "God bless you! for preventing those "Frenchmen from coming at us." And yet, we are, at the very same moment, boasting of our immense army of volunteers, the generalissimo of whom is publicly expressing his desire to meet Buonaparté upon our own shores! Such are the inconsistencies, into which people fall, when they seek to disguise their real sentiments.——The admiration of the London Common-council men appears to be confined to the blockading system, and their resolutions were, probably, intended as an unanswerable argument against those, by whom that system has been disapproved of; but, the winds and the rocks are daily furnishing a reply to these resolutions: three ships of the line and four frigates this system has already cost us; and, at the end of one year of this inglorious sort of warfare, we shall have lost vessels sufficient to make up no contemptible squadron, besides the incredible wear and tear of all the other ships employed in so trying a service; and that, too, while the enemy is constantly engaged in repairing his ships, and in building new ones.——But, if a common blockade merits such eulogia, what may not be expected by those who have invented, and those who shall execute, the famous *stone* expedition: a city deification at least; their statues erected in pastry or sweetmeats for the dinner of the next "Right "Honourable" Lord Mayor. This sneaking system of defence is precisely what one would expect the Cockneys to be delighted with; and, for that reason, if for no other, it is what every body else must reprobate. All the worst enterprizes of the last war; "a' th' trewly Breetush objects" of Mr. Dundas were calculated solely to please at Lloyd's Coffee House, and upon 'Change. The voice of the rest of the nation, the dictates of honour and of a love of glory were despised: the consequences were what we have seen; but the present ministers are not men to profit from the lesson.

VOLUNTEER BILL.——The volunteer consolidation bill is now undergoing a discussion in the House of Lords, whence, it is to be hoped, it may return with less imperfections than it now contains; or, at least, with less mischief in its provisions; for, unless the clause respecting the apprentices be done away, or greatly altered, the whole country will be disgusted; and, indeed, plunged into confusion. This clause opens a door to endless disputes between masters and apprentices: servants a man may get rid of, though not without much trouble and injury; but his apprentices he cannot; he is compelled to keep them, while this clause will, in effect, render them his masters. In short, a measure better calculated for disorganizing families, for rooting out of the minds of the youth all notions of subordination, never was invented by any of the democrats of the French revolution; and this measure the nation will owe to the wisdom of Mr. Pitt.——In the year 1740, Sir William Yonge, began a speech in Parliament with these words: "one of "the greatest perfections the laws of any "country can be attended with, is, to be so "plain, precise, and express in all their "clauses, as not to admit of any doubt, un-"certainty, or double-meaning." What would that gentleman have said, had he lived to see the laws of Mr. Yorke and the Doctor? The Parliament has now been at work for more than nine months discussing and making laws about raising men to defend the country, and, to this very hour, nobody knows what he has to do, or what he is to look for, as the consequence of those laws. Mably has reckoned an unsteadiness in the conduct of rulers, and an obscurity and uncertainty in their laws, as one of the strong symptoms of the decline and approaching fall of governments: let us hope, that the rule is not without an exception; for, conduct so unsteady, and laws so

obscure and uncertain, as those which we have the misery to witness, were never before exhibited to the world.—The public will recollect, that, towards the close of the discussion of this bill, in the House of Commons, General Tarleton spoke of the dissentions in Somersetshire. Those dissentions have given rise to a pamphlet, containing all the correspondence upon the subject; from which publication it clearly appears, that Mr. Champneys, the commandant, who had displayed a zeal in the service, worthy of the ancient and honourable family from which he is descended, has been most unworthily treated by the government. General Tarleton's statement is confirmed, in every particular, and the meanness of the ministers is, in this case more conspicious, if possible, than in any other.——In the report of the debate, which took place in the House of Lords on the 27th of March, the Bishop of Landaff, is stated to have styled the army "hired slaves." It is hardly credible, that his lordship should have made use of such an expression; but, as the newspaper editors have so reported his speech, and as the report has not been contradicted, it is proposed to submit, in a future sheet, a few considerations to his lordship on the subject; for, it is quite necessary, that the army should know, that we do not all regard them as "hired slaves;" as "the refuse of society, the very off-scourings of the "rabble." It is by no means meant to assert here, that his lordship did make use of these expressions; but, we certainly find them in a report of his speech, as given in The Morning Chronicle of the 28th of March; and, he must certainly rejoice at having an opportunity to disavow them, seeing that every one of his Sovereign's sons bear a rank in the army. His lordship has obliged the world with a speech, which he *intended* to deliver in the House of Lords: that speech, too, will now merit some attention, particularly as his lordship has conceived a project for "*paying off* the national debt;" a thing so very desirable, that one cannot refrain from listening to any proposition for effecting it.

IRISH TREASURY.——In consequence of the motions made by Lord Archibald Hamilton, an account has been laid before the House of Commons, showing the amount of payments made by the Government of Ireland, *at par*, to persons in and from Ireland, since the union. From this account, it appears, that the total amount of such payments above par was, in 1801 - £241 15 2
in 1801-2 - 253 4 5
in 1802-3 - 618 16 3

£1113 15 10

That is to say, that, in the course of three years, the public have paid £1113 15 10, more than they would have paid, if these payments had been made upon the same footing as the other payments from the Irish Treasury; and, why they were not so made, there appears to be no reason whatever. The amount of the sum is not of so much importance as the *principle* upon which it has been withdrawn from the public treasury. There is nothing so obviously impolitic, as well as unjust, as to shelter the officers of government from the effects of any cause, which operates against every other human being in the community: nothing can be so odious, nothing so dangerous, nothing that can furnish so plausible a ground for discontent with the government altogether. One-fourth part of the whole sum thus paid to Irish civil officers, residing in England, appears to have fallen to the share of Mr. Corry himself; and, as it was well asked by a correspondent, does Mr. Corry think, that a similar indulgence to English half pay officers, who have had the misfortune to be reduced in Ireland, would be unacceptable? Does he think, that it is not full as necessary to those persons as to himself? But, as this subject will, in all probability undergo a discussion in Parliament, the reader will, doubtless, gladly dispense with any further observations on it here: it is, however, impossible to refrain from expressing a hope, that an inquiry will be made as to the *legality of the authority* by which these payments have been made.

IRISH CURRENCY.——In the mean time, the people of Ireland begin to grow impatient under the consequences of that abundance of paper money, with which the wise measure of Bank restriction has supplied them. A depreciated paper is sure to produce a disappearance, or a degradation of the metallic money. In time, *all* the gold and silver, and even the copper would fly from the company of disgraced paper; but, for the purposes of change, some small pieces are pressed into the service; and these become debased, first, either by clipping or sweating, next by adulteration, and, finally, by mere plating and washing. To this last stage, the silver coin of Ireland has, we are told by several members of Parliament, made very rapid advances; and, by accounts from Dublin of the 31st ultimo, it appears, that the bakers and other persons dealing in the necessaries of life, having refused to take the base metal in circulation, very serious troubles were, for a while, at least, likely to ensue. The accounts, which have appeared in the newspapers are, in substance as follows: that great distresses had resulted from the stoppage in the circulation

of the base silver, not only at Dublin, but in all the circumjacent places; that, at Drogheda, on the 24th of March, being market-day, there was, by noon tide, a perfect stagnation of business, and the poor people who had come to market and sold their commodities, were obliged to go home without their bread and potatoes which they intended to purchase for their children; that, at Dublin, at an early hour on the 31st of March, the baker's shops were all shut, and not a loaf of bread was to be seen, the bakers having refused to bake, as the flour factors would not take the silver for which the former sold their bread; that, previous to this, to wit, on the 25th of March, at a meeting of the Mayor and Aldermen, the following letter was communicated form Sir Evan Nepean: "Dublin Castle, 28th March, "1804.—My lord, the *fullest consideration* "has been given to your lordship's representation of the inconvenience occasioned "to the inhabitants of the city of Dublin, "by the badness of the silver coin, and the "difficulty attending the purchase of all "articles of small value. Your lordship "may be assured that it is the anxious wish "of government to afford every possible degree of accommodation to the inhabitants "that the circumstances will admit of, and "with that view *measures will be taken for* "*procuring dollars* and *other coin* to supply "the circulation; but, from a variety of "considerations, it must be obvious to your "lordship, that any measure of that nature "cannot be carried into execution for a "considerable time to come. In the mean "while it appears expedient, that the impossibility of procuring an immediate supply, "and the necessity for some circulating medium, until such supply can be procured, "should be generally understood; as an opinion, that the silver medium now in circulation would be immediately cried down, "has probably in a great measure occasioned "the refusal to receive in payment this "coin. It must be obvious that greater "loss must be suffered by dealers of all descriptions, from the stagnation which "would be occasioned by stopping at once "the currency of this coin, without any "other medium to supply its place, than "could be suffered by a continuance of the "practice which has so long prevailed, and "that the labouring people and the poor "may suffer severely.—I have the honour to "be, &c. &c. EVAN NEPEAN."—On the 31st the Mayor distributed, by beat of drum, a short notification from Sir Evan Nepean, in these words: "There is no intention, at "present, of ordering the discontinuance of "the receipt of the best of the silver coin, "now in circulation, at the public offices." This notification was backed by a recommendation of the Mayor and Aldermen "to their fellow citizens to take in payment "the best of the silver coin, now in circu-"lation, as usual." The accounts conclude with stating, that the Mayor "proceeded "to the houses of several bakers, and *seized* "*a large quantity of concealed bread, which* "*be distributed to the poor.*"—Sir Evan Nepean's letter, though it has a good spice of the Doctor's ambiguity in it, does positively say one thing, and that is, that "measures "will be taken for procuring *dollars* and "*other coin* to supply the circulation;" and this promise was, we are told, made to the people of Dublin, after "the *fullest consider-*"*ration*," on the part of the government. Now, I take upon me to assert, either that the ministry in Ireland meant to deceive the people, or that they themselves are the most deceived of mankind: the latter is the probable conjecture. As easy would it be to make the Thames run back into Oxfordshire, as to introduce dollars and other pure coin, and make them circulate in company with the degraded paper of Ireland. Sir Evan does, indeed, ask for *time* wherein to perform this miracle, but, alas! it would require a much longer time than he has to live.—I am not a person of great curiosity: I never go to see giants or panoramas or phantasmagorias or any such sights; but, I must confess, that I should like to have seen the council at the castle assembled on this occasion: I should like to have heard the opinions of Lord Hardwicke and Sir Evan and Mr. Marsden and Lord Redesdale, upon this intricate and embarrassing subject! I hope that no mischief may happen; that the storm may blow over, till there are men and measures fit to meet it; but, let it never be forgotten, that the monarchy of France was destroyed by a depreciated money, and that the horrid and gigantic monster of revolution, which has swept over the better half of Europe, started from the door of a *baker's shop*.

BRITISH FINANCE.—Under this head, it was my intention to have made some remarks on a return which has been laid before parliament relative to the *income tax* and the war-taxes in general, as also on a return which has been made to an order of the House of the 29th of February, respecting the *permanent taxes*, and which return is glaringly imperfect, it being by no means conformable to the order. But these topics, as well as that of the *Birmingham dollars*, must give way, for the present, to the observations, which the official accounts now enable me to offer on the subject of the Con-

dated Fund.—In order to save much room and time, as well as to avoid useless repetition, I beg leave to refer the reader to an article upon this subject, in p. 444 of the present volume. He will there find a succinct history of the dispute between the Doctor and me, as to the amount of the surplus of the Consolidated Fund for the year 1803, and will also find a reference to other papers connected with the subject. I disapproved, not in private like Mr. Pitt, but openly and in print, of the Doctor's statement of the 10th of December 1802, when he counted upon a surplus of 7,500,000l. and actually included it in his ways and means, at 6,500,000l.: this by way of "*superabundant precaution.*" I contended, so early as the month of January 1803, that this surplus would not amount to more than 4,974,654l. or thereabouts. "Here," said I, "we are at issue: time only can decide between us." Time has now decided: the accounts are before the parliament: and, according to these accounts, the surplus is 5,162,428l. which sum, if we deduct 100,000l. for the regular annual depreciation of money, and that is quite little enough, exceeds my calculation only by 87,774l. while, of the Doctor's estimate, throwing aside the hundreds and parts, it falls short 2,738,000l. and of his "*confident* expectation," 1,438,000l. And, if we allow nothing at all for depreciation of money; if we make this unwarrantable exception in his favour; if we take his own figures, without any scrutiny whatever, his defalcation is 1,338,000l. which exceeds one-fourth part of the amount of his total produce.——Striking as these facts are; convincing as they must be to every mind that dwells upon them, though but for a moment; I am very far from supposing, that they will make any great public impression. The subject is by no means a pleasant one in itself, and the people, like a tradesman who feels conscious of his insolvency, hate to look into their accounts. They have, too, been so often deceived by flattering estimates on one side, and gloomy predictions on the other, that, at last, they know not what to believe, or what to think. Of the newspaper proprietors and editors some are hired to deceive them, and others are either too indolent or too ignorant to undeceive them, while a third class innocently communicate the deception which they themselves have imbibed: of which last a remarkable instance presents itself relative to the very account, which has furnished the materials for the deduction above drawn.——The editor of the Morning Herald, in that paper of the 17th of March, inserts the abstract of the account of the Consolidated Fund, making thereon the following most curious remark: "From the official account of the income "and charges of the year ending the 5th "of January last, it will be seen, that the "income amounted to 31,862,961l. whilst "the charges are only 26,700,533l. leaving "*a balance in favour of the country* of more "than five millions, a circumstance without example in the whole of our financial history." Now, it is evident, that this man really thought, that the charges upon this account included *the whole of the expenditure of the nation* for the year 1803, and that the taxes had yielded five millions more than that expenditure required; whereas, the charges upon the consolidated fund consist only of the expenses of the National Debt, of the Civil List, and of certain parliamentary pensions and grants; and, the five millions of balance, together with a small portion of receipts which do not come into this account, is all that there is left wherewith to defray the expenses of the Army, the Navy, the Ordnance, and the contingent services of the state, the residue being to be furnished by new taxes or by loans.—Nor are proofs of gross ignorance, upon this subject, confined to the columns of the diurnal prints, as may be seen by a reference to a very recent performance of the "British Critics," who are the less entitled to compassion, because, to all the assinine qualities of the editor of the Herald, they unite an uncommon portion of malignity. That part of their labours, which I here allude to, is contained in their reviewing pamphlet for the last month, and is what they call a review of "A Reply to some "financial mistatements, in and out of "Parliament;" a pamphlet made up out of a short-lived ministerial newspaper called "the Cabinet," and published more, I believe, than a twelve-month ago. The object of this pamphlet was, to controvert the statements of Lord Grenville in Parliament, and my statements out of Parliament, particularly those, which I have, in the former part of this article, referred to, relative to the surplus of the Consolidated Fund, and which, as I have shown, are *now* amply confirmed by the official documents laid before Parliament by my adversary himself. These "critics" are unfortunate in many respects, but in nothing more than the *time* which they choose for the effusions of the holy zeal that constantly burns within them for extending their parochial duties, their ghostly comforts, their cure of souls. Had they praised Mr. Addington's estimate and decried my calculations; had they recommended the ministerial pamphlet, "as well

" worthy of the attention of all those who " desire to have *accurate information* and to " form just opinions respecting the finances " of the country;" had they done this a year ago, or, indeed, at any time previous to the rendering of the account which has settled the dispute, they might have received some marks of the Premier's gratitude; but, as it is, they can expect nothing to afford them compensation for the public scorn. Naturalists have observed, that those creatures which are most venemous, are, upon the whole, also the most impotent: the serpent race have neither hair nor feathers, neither legs nor wings nor fins, they can neither run nor fly nor swim; so the British Critics seem doomed to crawl through the world, cursed with the constant disposition to wound, but having, wherewith to effect their purpose, neither industry, talents, judgment, nor wit.

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES.——Cobbett's PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, up to the XVth Number inclusive, are now published. Some information respecting the mode of obtaining these Numbers appears to be necessary to persons who live at a distance from the metropolis, and who, in many instances, seem to suppose, that they can be sent by the post, in the same way that the Register is. This is a mistake. Every number is a pamphlet, and can be procured only in the same manner that pamphlets, reviews, and magazines are; this is, generally, by application made to a country bookseller, who has a direct and frequent communication with London, of which description, booksellers are to be found in every country town of any importance.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.——Many gentlemen, who do this work the honour to choose it as the repository of those statements, remarks and reflexions, which they think proper to lay before the public, accompany their communications with a request to have an *early* insertion, and sometimes, to be informed whether their performances will be inserted at all, and, if at all, when. Notices to correspondents have been found to be greatly inconvenient. They are irksome both to the writer and the reader, and they occupy some little portion of that room, of which the Register stands so much in need. For these and some other reasons, it has been thought advisable here to state, once for all, that no more Notices to Correspondents will be inserted; but, it is proper, at the same time, to assure all those, who have already communicated, or who shall hereafter communicate, their essays to the Editor, that the greatest possible attention is, and always will be, paid by him to every thing so communicated; and, that, on no occasion, a delay in the insertion will ever take place from neglect or inattention on his part. It must, however, occur to every person at all acquainted with the nature, and the manner of conducting, such a publication, that delay, and even delay of considerable length, is frequently unavoidable. Nor can it be an invariable rule for each communication to be inserted in the order in which it is received. The Editor must sometimes be controled in his wishes by the length of the essay; and, he must much oftener yield to considerations as to the nature of the subject treated of. Some essays suffer nothing from a delay of a week or two, whereas others, though valuable at the time, become perfectly useless if kept back for a single day. This is so obvious, that it is hoped that no other apology will be required by several correspondents, whose communications have given way to others of a date much more recent. In short, it is evident, that each admission, or rejection, depends, and must always depend, upon many circumstances, of which the Editor only can be the judge: his judgment may not, indeed, be thought the best that could be wished for, but that is a point relative to which the writer must be supposed to have made up his mind previous to the making of his communication. If he may be allowed to add a wish of his own, on this occasion, it is, that no communication should be accompanied, either in writing or verbally, with a discovery of the name of the writer. A deviation from this rule must, as often as it takes place, subject him to some embarrassment, and can seldom fail to fetter his judgment.——On the score of *impartiality*, he looks upon himself as bound, by no tie whatsoever to admit any writing that is communicated to him, though it be in answer to a writing which he has published; because, were he to square his conduct, in this respect, by the rule of abstract impartiality, he would thereby be shackled by that which every other political writer sets at defiance. Nevertheless, he can truly affirm, that he never has rejected any performance, in which his statements and opinions have been controverted, provided that it was, in other respects, fit for publication.

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